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Briefing 3: Devolution, localism and social housing policy 
 
Introduction 
Drawing on presentations given across the seminar series as a whole this briefing paper 
explores examples of the way devolved government in the United Kingdom impacts on 
social housing policy. The paper suggests that further policy divergence may occur in future 
years, as the balance between state, civil society and market in the four jurisdictions became 
noticeably different following the 2007-08 financial crisis, the 2010 general election and the 
2014 referendum on Scottish independence. These differences show no sign of abating in 
the run up to the 2015 general election.  
 
Devolution and localism 
 
The development of UK devolution 
Elected assemblies and an associated set of devolved powers were introduced to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998, following referenda in each case, and the new bodies 
all sat for the first time in 1999. Devolved powers include housing, planning, education, 
health and regeneration in all four jurisdictions. Retained powers include most taxation, 
social security (except Northern Ireland, which has a parity agreement), defence and 
constitutional matters.  
 
The form of devolution in each jurisdiction was varied to begin with and has evolved 
differently depending upon the context, including local political and electoral support: 
 In Scotland, 74% voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament, with 63% also in favour of 
giving it tax-raising powers. Unlike the other assemblies, a power to introduce a 
marginal increase in income tax was granted in 1998, but has never been used. 
Further tax powers were introduced in 2012 and a referendum on Scottish 
independence in September 2014 resulted in 55% wishing to remain part of the UK.  
The Smith Commission, convened following the referendum, argued for the further 
devolution of powers to Scotland, including changes to borrowing powers and to 
welfare benefits.  
 In Wales, 50.3% voted in favour of a Welsh Assembly in 1999. The National 
Assembly for Wales was not given legislative responsibility, however it received a 
wide range of administrative powers as listed above. In 2011 in a second 
referendum, 63% supported the introduction of law-making powers for the Welsh 
Assembly, now the Welsh Government.  
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 In Northern Ireland (NI), 71% voted in favour of devolution as part of a wider 
referendum on the Good Friday Agreement, along with 94% in the Republic of 
Ireland. Thus in NI devolution was part of a peace settlement to try to bring the 
Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ to an end, which included government by a cross-
community enforced coalition. This structure proved initially to be unstable and the 
Assembly did not sit between 2002 and 2007. 
 
All three devolved administrations took housing policy extremely seriously in their early 
years, for example the ground-breaking Housing (Scotland) Act 2001; the first National 
Housing Strategy for Wales in the same year; and an inquiry into aspects of housing policy 
by Northern Ireland’s Social Development Committee in 2002. 
 
Pressures on the devolved administrations 
Following the establishment of the UK’s Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition after 
the 2010 general election, the political make-up of the devolved bodies differed from that of 
the UK Parliament. In Scotland, the Scottish National Party was in charge; in Wales, a 
minority Labour administration; and in Northern Ireland, a five-party coalition with the two 
largest parties being the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin. None of these parties 
were in favour of a smaller state or austerity driven welfare reform measures as a matter of 
principle, unlike the Coalition Government at UK level. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis from 2007 led to the imposition of austerity measures by the 
Coalition, including restrictions in the block grant to the devolved administrations (less so in 
Northern Ireland). In addition, welfare reform was introduced with the exception of Northern 
Ireland, which may set its own legislation in this area. Political differences under devolution 
have been evident and are beginning to shape new directions for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.  
 
In Scotland, austerity is generally accepted to have been one driver for the 2014 
independence referendum, and for the reaction from the UK government to provide Scotland 
with more tax-raising powers. Scotland has attempted to mitigate the effects of the 2012 
Welfare Reform Act through the Scottish Welfare Fund and additional funding for 
Discretionary Housing Payments, but the impact has still been severe. The potential for a 
different welfare system was a prominent part of the referendum debate, and has remained 
on the agenda through the Smith Commission and its subsequent recommendations. It is 
less clear that this is the situation in Wales, however support for the Welsh Government has 
increased since 1998. In Northern Ireland, budgets have been to some extent protected and 
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the Welfare Reform Bill has not yet been introduced; it is likely to be slightly different from 
the rest of the UK, with extra provisions (such as a much reduced use of the bedroom tax/ 
spare room subsidy) funded from the block grant. NI’s Stormont House Agreement linked the 
passing of the Welfare Reform Bill to the granting of powers to vary the rate of corporation 
tax, and NI’s five coalition parties are in favour of a lower rate, the difference also to be 
funded from the block grant. In all the jurisdictions, additional measures to mitigate the 
effects of welfare reform must be funded from cutting spending in other policy areas, or in 
the case of Scotland from increased taxation. Austerity has brought home the difference 
between devolution, which is conditional and constrained, and federalism, where powers can 
only be removed through constitutional change.  
 
Localism in the context of devolution 
Devolution should not be confused with localism. In the devolved administrations, there is an 
important local layer of government beneath the assemblies (less so in NI). Localism is not a 
new concept, having been adopted in some shape or form by governments since the 1970s 
as part of varying state/civil society dynamics over the years. It brings together spatial, 
administrative and political characteristics in a variety of combinations across the UK, and 
can operate either in the interests of communities or very much against them.   
 
In England, the Localism Act 2011 has codified the concept and linked it to the idea of the 
‘Big Society’, which was high profile at the time of the 2010 general election but has since 
faded from view, never gaining much traction outside England in any case. English localism 
involves powers for local ‘communities’ to challenge the standard of public service delivery 
and take over the running of services, to put together neighbourhood plans, and to allow 
councils some discretion on social housing allocations and tenancy conditions. Power is 
dispersed, but in the context of austerity and a punitive welfare system. Local action 
therefore becomes a necessity rather than a choice, and without adequate support systems 
the danger is that place-based inequalities may widen.  
 
In Scotland, community ownership and control has a long legacy, not least in housing. The 
Community Empowerment and Renewal Bill, currently under consideration, includes an 
extension of Community Right to Buy, the right to challenge service delivery, and support for 
tenant management organisations.  It also promotes community-asset ownership and 
community anchor organisations, roles often undertaken by housing associations.  In Wales 
and Northern Ireland, localism is less of a familiar concept. Some aspects of the Localism 
Act 2011 apply to Wales, which is also pursuing community asset transfer (which is popular 
across the UK). In Northern Ireland, a restructuring of local government from April 2015 
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includes the introduction of a statutory community planning system and the devolution of a 
small number of services to local level, including planning, urban regeneration and 
community development. However, many important services such as housing, social 
services and education will remain at regional level and there is still disquiet about the 
exercise of local discretion in a divided society.  
 
The social housing sector under devolution  
 
Governance in hard times 
The UK Government’s austerity agenda has had an impact on the governance of social 
housing in all four jurisdictions. In England, Scotland and Wales, the impact of the Coalition’s 
welfare restructuring through the Welfare Reform Act 2012 has been profound. The 
‘bedroom tax’/ ‘spare room subsidy’ is the most prominent aspect for social landlords but by 
no means the only one. The bedroom tax has led to a measurable increase in the proportion 
of tenants in arrears and the amount they owe.  This means the cost of collecting rent and 
supporting tenants in arrears has also risen for landlords. Discretionary Housing Payments 
have been found to be inadequate and there remains a lack of small properties for 
households who wish to move, although some landlords are responding to this in terms of 
changing their allocations policies and development priorities. Wider reforms to the Housing 
Benefit system have also hit low-income and young household hard, through restrictions to 
the Shared Accommodation Rate and levels of Local Housing Allowance. 
 
Other aspects of welfare restructuring have affected household income, with the biggest falls 
coming from the introduction of Employment and Support Allowance to replace Incapacity 
Benefits, changes to tax credits, and uprating of payments below the rate of inflation. The 
move to Universal Credit, paid monthly, may cause problems with budgeting, and assumes 
certain levels of IT literacy as applications are required to be completed online. Sanctions 
imposed on JSA claimants are also a matter of concern (this measure also applies to 
Northern Ireland), and reflect the increasingly conditional nature of welfare support in the 
UK. Many households with benefit income are affected by more than one of these changes, 
and people with disabilities have been identified as the group that has been most 
disadvantaged. The overall loss of income causes a dilemma for the governance of social 
housing, for example it introduces a new dimension into decisions on rent increases.  
Welfare restructuring is, however, only one component of a wider austerity agenda which is 
having an impact on social landlords. There is increasing pressure on supply, due to 
increasing need, along with failure in England to replace Right to Buy losses with an 
equivalent new property (the Right to Buy in Scotland will end in August 2016). Low paid and 
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insecure employment is on the rise, which may also contribute to rent arrears and which, 
along with more restrictive mortgage criteria, has led to declining home ownership and an 
increase in demand for intermediate products such as mid-market renting and shared equity. 
Registered Social Landlords need to consider whether to begin or expand operations in 
these areas; all social landlords also need to bear in mind the impact of austerity on ‘housing 
plus’ activities. Finally, reductions in public subsidy – applied in different ways across the UK 
– are leading to RSLs looking for new forms of private finance such as bonds, at a time 
when their income stream is becoming less secure. All social landlords, but particularly those 
dependent upon private finance, must meet the sometimes contradictory requirements of 
regulators, lenders, and increasingly vulnerable tenants. Although this applies across the 
UK, the situation appears to be most acute in England.  
 
New threats to the social housing sector also raise questions about the scale and nature of 
governance. Does increased risk pose less of a threat to larger organisations, and if so is 
there now a renewed incentive for mergers – especially outside England, where there has 
been less of a trend towards this in previous years? And can tenants make a meaningful 
contribution to governance in the current climate? These questions were addressed in our 
Seminar Series Briefing 2 (Moore and McKee, 2014). In Wales and Scotland there is an 
increasing interest in community-led housing options, which in Scotland builds on a longer 
tradition. The Welsh ‘community mutual’ model includes tenants as majority shareholders. In 
Scotland, community-based housing associations are thriving as part of a wider promotion of 
community assets, despite cuts to new build programmes. In both jurisdictions there is an 
emphasis on wider regeneration activities. In England, community land trusts and self-help 
housing groups are growing, albeit in a social housing environment dominated by large 
housing associations. In Northern Ireland a restructuring of the social housing sector is 
under way which includes the planned dismantling of the Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive and its replacement with several large housing associations (Moore and McKee, 
2014). This finance-driven plan is at an early stage. At the same time NI’s existing housing 
associations are embarking on a series of mergers and other collaborative partnerships 
which are leading to an increase in their size. Although some associations have tenants on 
their Board of management, there is no plan for community-led housing bodies.  
 
Thus there is evidence of the development of different types of community-led social 
landlords across the UK, most prominently in Scotland and Wales, along with the continued 
existence of RSLs of different sizes, even if some are unable to develop new homes at the 
present time. This bodes well for the sector across the UK, despite the increasing risks it 
faces from other directions.  
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Access to social housing  
Unlike welfare benefits, access to social housing is a devolved function across the UK and 
here there are policy differences, although all within a continuum of conditionality. Policies in 
all jurisdictions are affected by financial cutbacks as decided by the UK Parliament and 
administered by the UK Treasury. Although conditionality itself is not a new element in the 
allocation of public goods, it is instructive to trace how the balance between rights and 
discretion is being reconstructed in the different jurisdictions.  
 
In England, the Localism Act 2011 and subsequent guidance has introduced a much larger 
amount of local discretion to the social housing allocations process, within the framework of 
still prioritising ‘reasonable preference’ groups and meeting statutory homeless obligations. 
Discretion includes the option of ‘flexible’ tenancies (normally for a minimum of five years, 
but as low as two is permissible);homelessness duty to be discharged by an offer in the 
private rented sector without the applicant’s consent; and applicants being required to live in 
the area for at least two years before being considered for social housing. Councils also 
have discretion to exclude households from the waiting list for various other reasons, such 
as past behaviour. These reforms have fundamentally challenged the notion of a social 
housing tenancy for life in England, which tenants elsewhere in the UK continue to enjoy. 
 
Wales operates a variant of the English model but does not compel homeless applicants into 
the private rented sector. However, as has been observed in Scotland and to a lesser extent 
in Northern Ireland, once a power exists to use the private rented sector to discharge a 
statutory obligation, it can be used in practice even without overt coercion of the applicant. 
Given the different tenancy conditions that exist in the PRS, it then becomes both the cause 
of homelessness and a route out of it. In Northern Ireland, the allocations process is carefully 
controlled at regional level with a single allocation route administered by the Northern Ireland 
Housing Executive. The responsibility has not been delegated to local councils in the recent 
reform of local government, as it is still considered to be too sensitive an issue. Unlike the 
rest of the UK, local lettings schemes are only permitted if agreed by the Department of 
Social Development, and choice-based lettings are only at the pilot stage. Social housing 
tenancies remain permanent, with the exception of provision of an introductory tenancy. 
In Scotland, the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 widened eligibility under 
homelessness legislation by removing the ‘priority need’ category which still exists in the rest 
of the UK. Although local authorities can, and indeed do, discharge their statutory duties into 
the private rental sector.  A single Scottish Secure Tenancy from 2001 and the Scottish 
Social Housing Charter from 2010, provide a floor of rights for social housing tenants across 
the sector, however, more recently there have been moves by the Scottish Government to 
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introduce ‘introductory’ tenancies for all new tenants:  a measure that has come under heavy 
critique from a coalition of Charitable and Third Sector organisations.  At the same time, 
legislation since 2001 has progressively restricted the Right to Buy in order to protect supply, 
especially in areas of high need.  There is no residence restriction on joining a social 
housing waiting list.  
 
Therefore a range of approaches to access social housing are evident across the UK. To 
this we must add that practice would vary within England, given the amount of local 
discretion now permitted. However, in every jurisdiction more progressive legislation can be 
compromised by lack of resources, and other financial pressures such as welfare 
restructuring. There are times when austerity may compromise local policy preferences in 
the devolved administrations. Despite this, access to social housing provides a good 
illustration of how changes can still be made under devolution, in contrast to the impact of 
welfare restructuring where this power has only been available in Northern Ireland.  
 
Conclusion  
Both devolution and localism are contributing to a restructuring of the UK state, albeit in an 
uneven manner and with distinct pockets of resistance in the devolved administrations. 
Overall, the trend is toward a smaller state, with service provision contracted out to the 
market or voluntary sector, and conditional access to services rather than a rights-based 
system. Civil society is becoming drawn into the provision of former ‘public’ services in order 
to fill the gap as the state retrenches, whilst the role of the market is expanding to provide 
services under contract and also access to loan finance for social purposes. All these factors 
are having an adverse impact on social housing provision.  
 
Both devolution and localism provide opportunities for new sites of empowerment for both 
the local state and civil society. However, political drivers at UK level from 2010 onwards 
(and arguably before that) raise the question whether responsibility is being devolved without 
power. For example, it was clear in the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence that 
some political parties were actively campaigning against austerity measures and would not 
have chosen to implement the Coalition’s welfare reforms.  Equally, RSLs as civil society 
organisations are now facing new risk factors that were not of their making. This raises the 
question whether further social housing policy divergence within the UK may occur in future 
years, with England becoming more and more distinctive in the UK context. We suggest that 
the ongoing impact of constitutional change on social housing policy and practice will 




If you are interested in reading further on this theme, please see presentations on the 
website by: 
 Kim McKee, University of St Andrews (Seminars 1 and 3) 
 Tony Manzi, University of Westminster (Seminar 1) 
 John Flint, University of Sheffield (Seminar 2) 
 Greg Lloyd, University of Ulster (Seminar 2) 
 John McPeake, Northern Ireland Housing Executive (Seminar 2) 
 David Robinson, Sheffield Hallam University (Seminar 2) 
 Mary Taylor, Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (Seminar 2) 
 Keith Edwards, CIH Wales (Seminar 3) 
 Jenny Muir, Queen’s University Belfast (Seminar 3) 
 Keith Dryburgh, Citizen’s Advice Scotland (Seminar 3) 
 David Orr, National Housing Federation (Seminar 3) 
 Peter Wells, Sheffield Hallam University (Seminar 3) 
 Colleen Rowan, GWSF (Seminar 3) 
 
Please also see Moore, T. and McKee, K. (2014) Briefing 2: Localism and New Housing 




Further information about the seminar series can be found at: 
http://bigsocietylocalismhousing.co.uk/ 
 
The organisers of this seminar wish to acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social 
Research Council, Grant Number ES/J021172/1 
